392 research outputs found
The silence of self-knowledge
Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p
Blind Rule-Following and the Regress of Motivations
Normativists about belief hold that belief formation is essentially rule- or norm-guided. On this view, certain norms are constitutive of or essential to belief in such a way that no mental state not guided by those norms counts as a belief, properly construed. In recent influential work, Kathrin GlĂŒer and Ă
sa Wikforss develop novel arguments against normativism. According to their regress of motivations argument, not all belief formation can be rule- or norm-guided, on pain of a vicious infinite regress. I argue that the regress of motivations argument is unsuccessful: an appeal to the notion of blind rule-following, drawn from a plausible interpretation of Ludwig Wittgensteinâs remarks on rule-following, stops the regress of motivations in its tracks
Hard and Blind: On Wittgenstein's Genealogical View of Logical Necessity
My main aim is to sketch a certain reading (âgenealogical') of later Wittgenstein's views on logical necessity. Along the way, I engage with the inferentialism currently debated in the literature on the epistemology of deductive logic.publishedVersio
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Further Reflections on the âPostmodern Turnâ in the Social Sciences: A Reply to William Outhwaite
I am immensely grateful to William Outhwaite for commenting on my book The âPostmodern Turnâ in the Social Sciences (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). I should stress at the outset that I agree with most of the points he makes in his commentary, which I find very insightful, thought-provoking, and constructive. Hence, any reader expecting to be entertained by a cockfight between book author and book reviewer will be disappointed. Let me take this opportunity to reflect on some of the main issues raised in Outhwaiteâs inspiring review
Inferentialism as an alternative to socioconstructivism in mathematics education
The purpose of this article is to draw the attention of mathematics education researchers to a relatively new semantic theory called inferentialism, as developed by the philosopher Robert Brandom. Inferentialism is a semantic theory which explains concept formation in terms of the inferences individuals make in the context of an intersubjective practice of acknowledging, attributing, and challenging one anotherâs commitments. The article argues that inferentialism can help to overcome certain problems that have plagued the various forms of constructivism, and socioconstructivism in particular. Despite the range of socioconstructivist positions on offer, there is reason to think that versions of these problems will continue to haunt socioconstructivism. The problems are that socioconstructivists (i) have not come to a satisfactory resolution of the social-individual dichotomy, (ii) are still threatened by relativism, and (iii) have been vague in their characterization of what construction is. We first present these problems; then we introduce inferentialism, and finally we show how inferentialism can help to overcome the problems. We argue that inferentialism (i) contains a powerful conception of norms that can overcome the social-individual dichotomy, (ii) draws attention to the reality that constrains our inferences, and (iii) develops a clearer conception of learning in terms of the mastering of webs of reasons. Inferentialism therefore represents a powerful alternative theoretical framework to socioconstructivism
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